The art of analysing what your enemy does is not as subtle
as any novel or movie makes you believe. The enemy in any place is every bit as
complicated as you are, every bit as simple as you are, every bit as deep and
shallow as you are. The reason for those adjectives in the intelligence
business is pretty obvious. The enemy also has a host of political, social,
economic and psychological factors featuring in his decision. No enemy is
simple. You have hassels getting clearance to run an operation, he too has
hassles, not th same one or maybe not even similar ones but he has hassels
nonetheless. For example take the examples of india Pakistan and afganistan. In
india you would have to deal with the politicians currently in power and your
own boss’s ego, In Pakistan you would have to deal with the army, the ISI and
depending on where you are working the mujadiheen/fidayeen, In afganistan you
would have to consult with the ISAF, The president/chief of intelligence and
also wonder if the plan you have is right especially for the place you are
working.
As field spooks will probably tell you working in every terrain and condition is as different from another as a cabbage is from an apple. The point being simple, you have a standard se tof rules, but u have to adapt those very rules to do your job properly. If you can walk in Kashmir like a local then you can blend in well there but if you try the same in Hyderabad or muzzafar nagar you probably will stand out instead of blending in, and standing out is a nightmare for any operative. The problem with any intelligence structure is the gap between its field agents and field officers. The field officers know best what to do when a gun is staring you straight in the face, but not how much it costs to bury the mess. A field officer will grumble about being sent to some places, he will do it don’t u doubt that but he will grumble too about all that he is doing in the name of his country but he wont know why he is being ordered to the certain place. Of course anyone reading these arguments will tell you that compartmentalization is highly valued and extrememly important in any intelligence business. The fact that no one knows more than he needs to know is somwthing that every agency operated upon but the question always remains who is it that decides how much a field operative should know?? The same problem exists with analysts too. They are given all of their need to know data and asked to analyse and form conclusions from it. The thing about that is that, half knowledge always leads to wrong conclusions, every individual might understand the others in a different way. So the conclusion drawn out may be accurate but if they are not it might only be due to their lack of data. Hence the advisable thing to do is to have one chief analyst above all the minions and have him analyse the whole picture at once. Unless that happens no proper analysis can take place. Of course this mechanism may already be in place in many of the organization but nevertheless one person second guessing 10 peoples opinion playing the devils advocate never arms anybody. However this is a procedure that can and should be undertaken for data for whose analysis atleast a day or two time exists. If the data need sot be handled quickly it is better to place the onus in the hands of a senior analyst and let him work, or for the sake of redundancy two senior analysts may be asked their opinion on the topic and their consolidated outputs taken into consideration.
As for field officers their command structure is to be entirely different, they cannot have a centralised command to keep an eye on them regularly. For officers working under diplomatic cover the centralized methodologies might work, but for agents who are not trying to centralize them is potentially asking for disaster. The intelligence agencies can themselves learn from the terrorist’ s book in this case. The sleeper cells of the terrorist are silent cells activated at the certain time. The intelligence agencies can use that methodology and pass information, all information they have on the agents target to the black agent once a while and at the same time retrieve all the intelligence he has gathered for th intermediate duration. Such practices will also boost the trust agents hav eint heir agencies. The security risk of handing out such data is paramount but the risk of not doing so is great too. The advantage of such agents is their ability to blend into the local populace and acquire intelligence with boots on the ground. The factors of risk are ever present in this business but the rewards when reaped are great in themselves.
I believe that intelligence agencies are already practicing the above said protocols and they are far more intelligent than any of us. However the above article is just an attempt to look into their functionsing and maybe justify their work to the common people.
As field spooks will probably tell you working in every terrain and condition is as different from another as a cabbage is from an apple. The point being simple, you have a standard se tof rules, but u have to adapt those very rules to do your job properly. If you can walk in Kashmir like a local then you can blend in well there but if you try the same in Hyderabad or muzzafar nagar you probably will stand out instead of blending in, and standing out is a nightmare for any operative. The problem with any intelligence structure is the gap between its field agents and field officers. The field officers know best what to do when a gun is staring you straight in the face, but not how much it costs to bury the mess. A field officer will grumble about being sent to some places, he will do it don’t u doubt that but he will grumble too about all that he is doing in the name of his country but he wont know why he is being ordered to the certain place. Of course anyone reading these arguments will tell you that compartmentalization is highly valued and extrememly important in any intelligence business. The fact that no one knows more than he needs to know is somwthing that every agency operated upon but the question always remains who is it that decides how much a field operative should know?? The same problem exists with analysts too. They are given all of their need to know data and asked to analyse and form conclusions from it. The thing about that is that, half knowledge always leads to wrong conclusions, every individual might understand the others in a different way. So the conclusion drawn out may be accurate but if they are not it might only be due to their lack of data. Hence the advisable thing to do is to have one chief analyst above all the minions and have him analyse the whole picture at once. Unless that happens no proper analysis can take place. Of course this mechanism may already be in place in many of the organization but nevertheless one person second guessing 10 peoples opinion playing the devils advocate never arms anybody. However this is a procedure that can and should be undertaken for data for whose analysis atleast a day or two time exists. If the data need sot be handled quickly it is better to place the onus in the hands of a senior analyst and let him work, or for the sake of redundancy two senior analysts may be asked their opinion on the topic and their consolidated outputs taken into consideration.
As for field officers their command structure is to be entirely different, they cannot have a centralised command to keep an eye on them regularly. For officers working under diplomatic cover the centralized methodologies might work, but for agents who are not trying to centralize them is potentially asking for disaster. The intelligence agencies can themselves learn from the terrorist’ s book in this case. The sleeper cells of the terrorist are silent cells activated at the certain time. The intelligence agencies can use that methodology and pass information, all information they have on the agents target to the black agent once a while and at the same time retrieve all the intelligence he has gathered for th intermediate duration. Such practices will also boost the trust agents hav eint heir agencies. The security risk of handing out such data is paramount but the risk of not doing so is great too. The advantage of such agents is their ability to blend into the local populace and acquire intelligence with boots on the ground. The factors of risk are ever present in this business but the rewards when reaped are great in themselves.
I believe that intelligence agencies are already practicing the above said protocols and they are far more intelligent than any of us. However the above article is just an attempt to look into their functionsing and maybe justify their work to the common people.
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